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Comment  Gary Burtless
This chapter traces out the eﬀects of population aging on a few key labor 
market variables: the labor force participation rate; the unemployment rate; 
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ﬂ  ows into and out of employment, unemployment, and the labor force; 
and trends in average wages and the variance of wages. The authors oﬀer a 
clear survey of some of the main issues that link the population age struc-
ture to these variables. A couple of outcomes examined by the authors are 
mainly interesting to specialists. Others are interesting to a much wider audi-
ence, one that includes both policymakers and the economists who advise 
them. Labor force participation and the unemployment rate are particularly 
important, both to analysts who are interested in predicting the next quar-
ter’s or next year’s gross domestic product (GDP) and to policymakers who 
want to know how closely the current path of GDP is tracking the potential 
growth path.
A number of economists have investigated some of the key impacts of 
population aging considered here. Both the labor force participation rate 
and the unemployment rate have been the focus of considerable research. 
The paper by Thomas Lemieux at this conference considers in detail the past 
eﬀects of population age structure on the distribution of wages (Lemieux, 
chapter 1 in this volume). In a 1999 paper, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger 
examined alternative explanations for the sharp decline in the U.S. unem-
ployment rate during the 1990s. Like the authors of this chapter, they esti-
mated the eﬀects of the population age structure. Reassuringly, Katz and 
Krueger found almost the same eﬀect of age structure on the unemployment 
rate as is reported in this chapter. Katz and Krueger concluded that most 
of the aging eﬀect occurred in the ten-  year period after 1979. The eﬀect of 
changing age structure on the unemployment rate after the mid-  1990s was 
much less important (Katz and Krueger 1999).
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has been in the business of 
making participation and unemployment rate forecasts for several decades. 
It does not use the same methods developed by these authors, but the meth-
ods are broadly similar. Analysts in the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary develop 
forecasts of the U.S. population, the labor force, and the employed popu-
lation. In addition, they predict the labor force and unemployed population 
within subpopulations deﬁ  ned by age, gender, marital status, and the pres-
ence or absence of child dependents.
In making their short-   and long-  term forecasts, the SSA analysts do not 
assume future participation and unemployment rates within age-  gender 
groups will remain stable. According to an analysis published a few years 
ago, their projections ‘’. . . also include a ‘lagged-  cohort eﬀect’ that applies 
changes in participation rates for a cohort at a speciﬁ  c age (relative to earlier 
cohorts at the same age) to participation rates for that cohort at older ages 
(Motsiopoulos and Tucker 2005, 4).” In other words, like Fallick, Fleis-
chman, and Pingle, the SSA analysts believe that birth cohort plays a sizeable 
role in explaining the trend in participation rates.
The authors of this chapter emphasize that cohort-  speciﬁ  c eﬀects seem 
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ployment. Women who entered the labor force in 1973 were systemati-
cally diﬀerent from those who entered in 1963 or in 1983, and the cohort 
diﬀerences have persisted in succeeding decades. More recent birth cohorts 
have generally had participation rates and unemployment experiences that 
are more similar to those of male counterparts who are the same age. Not 
surprisingly, however, birth cohort models have little ability to predict a 
cohort’s early-  career participation and unemployment experiences. I also 
wonder whether cohort models are very successful in accounting for trends 
in labor status among people who are past the traditional retirement age.
Women’s participation at older ages is rising in line with each cohort’s 
lagged participation rate at younger ages. This goes a long way toward 
explaining the elevated participation rates of women who are now between 
sixty and seventy-  ﬁ  ve years old. The cohort models do not provide a full 
explanation for rising participation rates among women past age sixty, how-
ever. Part of the recent rise is explained by other phenomena, a fact the 
authors recognize. In addition, cohort models cannot account for any of the 
rise in labor force participation among men past the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Over 
the past three decades participation rates of ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ   fty- nine- year- old 
men have drifted downward in an erratic pattern. In contrast, the long- term 
decline in participation rates of men sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older came to an end in 
the mid- 1980s. Since the early 1990s participation rates of men past sixty- ﬁ  ve 
have been rising. Figure 10C.1 shows the trend in labor force participation 
rates of successive overlapping birth cohorts of men born between 1922 and 
1944. The top line shows the participation rate of a given cohort when it was 
between ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and ﬁ  fty-  nine years old; the middle line, the rate when it 
was between sixty and sixty-  four; and the bottom line, the rate when it was 
sixty- ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine-  years-  old. The youngest birth cohort, born between 
1940 and 1944, had a labor force participation rate at age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty- 
nine that was 2.8 percentage points below the comparable rate of the old-
est cohort, born between 1922 and 1926. On the other hand, the youngest 
cohort had a participation rate between ages sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine that 
was 11.2 percentage points above the comparable rate of the oldest cohort 
shown. Obviously, cohort models cannot easily account for the diverging 
trends of men younger than sixty and older than sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
Economists are interested in these trends for purposes of explaining the 
trend in the average and median retirement age; that is, the typical age at 
which full- career workers withdraw from the labor force. My reading of the 
evidence is that the age of labor force withdrawal has become more vari-
able with successive birth cohorts. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s there was 
more clustering of retirement ages among workers in a given birth cohort. 
Full-  career workers were more likely to retire within a few years of the 
modal retirement age, say, age sixty-  two or sixty-  ﬁ  ve. In contrast, work-
ers are now more likely to withdraw at ages well before sixty and well past 
sixty- ﬁ  ve.420        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
Economists, including these authors, have oﬀered plausible suggestions to 
account for trends in labor force withdrawal within successive birth cohorts 
(Burtless and Quinn 2001; Aaronson et al. 2006). One reason for increasing 
labor force participation at older ages is that both the public and private 
retirement systems now provide smaller incentives for early labor force with-
drawal. From 1950 through the early 1980s, the net value of social security 
pensions tended to rise relative to after-  tax wages for successive cohorts of 
retirees. Amendments to the Social Security Act passed in 1977 and 1983 
brought this liberalization to an end. The after-  tax value of social secu-
rity pensions has gradually declined compared with the after-  tax value of 
wages for workers who have retired since the 1980s. Equally important, the 
penalty on earning wages while collecting a social security check has been 
substantially reduced, and this change has encouraged some pensioners to 
ﬁ  nd part-  time or bridge jobs after they leave their career jobs. For a minor-
ity of workers these beneﬁ  t trends have delayed the age of full exit from the 
labor force.
The private pension system has also shifted in a direction that encourages 
work later in life. Between 1980 and 2004 the fraction of workers who were 
exclusively covered by a deﬁ  ned-  beneﬁ  t (DB) plan fell from 60 percent to just 
11 percent of all pension- covered workers. In the same period workers exclu-
sively covered by a deﬁ  ned-  contribution (DC) plan rose from 17 percent to 
Fig. 10C.1    Labor force participation rate of successive male birth cohorts at 
selected ages, 1976–  2009
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61 percent of all pension-  covered workers (Munnell and Perun 2006). The 
two kinds of pension produce very diﬀerent retirement incentives. Deﬁ  ned- 
beneﬁ  t pensions penalize many workers who delay retirement past the plan’s 
early or normal pension-  claiming age. In many DB plans, it is ﬁ  nancially 
advantageous for workers to quit their jobs and accept a pension as soon 
as they reach the initial beneﬁ  t-  claiming age. Deﬁ  ned-  contribution pension 
plans are much more age-  neutral in their retirement incentives. So long as a 
worker remains employed in a DC- covered job, the employer, the worker, or 
both can continue to make contributions to the plan, and the contribution 
remains the same percentage of the worker’s wage. Because DC pensions 
provide little incentive to retire at one age rather than another, farsighted 
workers might choose to remain in their career jobs longer in order to build 
up their retirement wealth.
The changes just mentioned help account for the fact that some workers 
now withdraw from the labor force later than was the case among their coun-
terparts in the 1980s and 1990s. Another explanation is needed to account 
for earlier labor force withdrawal among a minority of workers. One expla-
nation for earlier labor force exit is the rise in lifetime wealth. Increasing 
wages and wealth have made many workers better oﬀ compared with their 
parents and grandparents. Some workers use part of their increased wealth 
to leave the workforce before reaching the social security retirement age. 
This behavior is economically rational if career workers ﬁ  nd their jobs less 
attractive than the activities they can pursue when they retire. A second 
explanation for earlier labor force exit is the increased availability and gen-
erosity of disability beneﬁ  ts. In recent years workers have found it easier to 
collect beneﬁ  ts for some disabling conditions. Other workers have seen dis-
ability beneﬁ  ts grow faster than their potential wages, increasing the poten-
tial payoﬀ to ﬁ  ling a disability claim (Autor and Duggan 2003).
Since 2000 there have been two major surprises in labor force trends. 
The ﬁ  rst involves men and women past age sixty-  two. Their participation 
and employment rates are currently higher than many forecasting models 
predicted in the late 1990s. The trend toward later retirement has acceler-
ated among a minority of older workers. The second and bigger surprise 
has been the changed behavior of the young. They are less likely to be labor 
force participants than young adults in the late 1990s. Figure 10C.2 displays 
a social security forecast of labor force participation generated for the 2000 
OASDI Trustees’ Report. The report was published in April 2000, and the 
forecast itself was developed in the second half of 1999. Figure 10C.2 shows 
the SSA forecast of labor force participation among sixteen-  to twenty- four- 
year- olds. The solid, dark line shows the actual labor force participation rate 
of sixteen-   to twenty-  four-  year-  olds as published by the BLS. The lighter 
line shows SSA’s intermediate forecast of that participation rate developed 
for the 2000 OASDI Trustees’ Report. Starting in 2001 the actual participa-
tion rate of young adults fell sharply, declining 8.9 percentage points in nine 422        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
years. The SSA forecast predicted a much smaller decline in young adult 
participation.
The error resulted in a considerable overstatement of the number of 
sixteen-   to twenty-  four-  year-  old labor force participants. By 2009 the over-
statement of the youthful labor force amounted to 3.7 million young adults. 
It seems doubtful whether any economist before 1999 had a model that 
accurately predicted this decline. It is also doubtful whether, even after the 
participation decline became known, we had a model that could account for 
the magnitude and suddenness of the drop. In the previous recession, which 
began in 1990, young adults’ labor force participation fell less than a third 
as much as it did after 2000.
In an extension of the research reported here it would be useful to show 
estimates of the impact of population aging on aggregate labor supply, when 
aggregate supply is adjusted to reﬂ  ect the expected productivity of the work 
hours supplied. In ﬁ  gures 10.4 and 10.6 the authors give us projections of 
aggregate labor supply as measured by the labor force participation rate of 
the population sixteen and older. In ﬁ  gure 10.31 they give projections of the 
impact of the changing age structure on average wages. A straightforward 
extension is to develop estimates of the impact of the age structure on aggre-
gate hours of work and on work hours weighted by expected productivity 
Fig. 10C.2    Actual and predicted participation rates of 16–  24-  year-  old adults, 
1980– 2020
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and unpublished data from Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary, 
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per hour. The results in ﬁ  gure 10.31 weight each observed wage by the num-
ber of workers who earn or who are expected to earn that hourly wage rate. 
An alternative adjustment is to weight each observed wage by the number of 
hours that is paid that wage. This weighting scheme takes into account not 
only the age proﬁ  le of labor force participation but also of expected hours 
worked in a given week. When labor force growth is caused by an inﬂ  ux of 
teenagers and young adults (groups with relatively low wages), the growth in 
productivity- weighted labor supply is slower than the growth in either labor 
force participation or aggregate work hours. The estimates in ﬁ  gure 10.31 
imply, however, that the expected hourly wage of U.S. workers has risen as a 
result of population aging. The average wage will continue to rise, although 
very slowly, over the projection period. Thus, some of the expected future 
slowdown in labor force growth will be oﬀset by the rising average wage of 
an older workforce. For purposes of predicting the future trend growth in na-
tional income, it would be useful to know the approximate size of this oﬀset.
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